According to UC San Francisco (UCSF) researchers' review of previously
classified industry data, the chemical industry borrowed a page from the
tobacco industry's strategy when it learned about and hid its knowledge of
the health risks associated with exposure to PFAS (per- and polyfluoroalkyl
compounds).
An article that was just released in Annals of Global Health on May 31,
2023, looks at records from the two biggest PFAS producers, DuPont and 3M.
In order to postpone public awareness of PFAS toxicity and, therefore, rules
limiting its use, the industry employed several strategies, which are
examined in this research. PFAS are extensively used compounds that are very
resistant to degrading, earning them the moniker "forever chemicals." They
are found in clothes, home goods, and food products. They are currently
pervasive in both the environment and individuals.
According to Tracey J. Woodruff, Ph.D., professor and director of the UCSF
Program on Reproductive Health and the Environment (PRHE), a former senior
scientist and policy advisor at the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA),
and senior author of the paper, "These documents reveal clear evidence that
the chemical industry knew about the dangers of PFAS and failed to let the
public, regulators, and even their own employees know the risks."
Scientists have never before examined these PFAS industry documents using
techniques intended to reveal tobacco industry tricks.
For decades, negative impacts have been recognized.
The covert industrial records were uncovered in a lawsuit brought by lawyer
Robert Bilott, whose case against DuPont for PFAS pollution made headlines
and whose life was depicted in the movie "Dark Waters." Bilott provided the
45-year period of records, from 1961 to 2006, to the filmmakers of the film
"The Devil We Know," who then handed them to the UCSF Chemical Industry
records Library.
"Having access to these documents allows us to see what the manufacturers
knew and when, but also how polluting industries keep critical public health
information private," said the study's first author, Nadia Gaber, MD, Ph.D.,
who oversaw the research as a PRHE fellow and is currently a resident in
emergency medicine. This study is crucial to informing policy and advancing
the cautious regulatory paradigm for chemicals.
According to the authors of the paper "The Devil They Knew: Chemical
Documents Analysis of Industry Influence on PFAS Science," there was little
public knowledge of the toxicity of PFAS for the first 50 years of their
use, even though "industry had multiple studies showing adverse health
effects at least 21 years before they were reported in public
findings."
According to the article, DuPont conducted internal animal and occupational
research that showed PFAS toxicity, but they neglected to publish those
results in the scientific literature and failed to submit their findings to
EPA as required by TSCA. All of these documents were labelled as
'confidential,' and in some cases, business leaders express a clear desire
to have the memo destroyed.
Suppressing data to safeguard a product
The article charts a chronology of what the chemical industry knew vs what
the general public understood and evaluates the tactics employed to hide
information or defend their dangerous goods. Examples comprise:
According to a company report from 1961, Teflon's Chief of Toxicology
discovered that Teflon materials had "the ability to increase the size of
the liver of rats at low doses," and recommended that the chemicals "be
handled 'with extreme care' and that 'contact with the skin should be
strictly avoided.'"
In a 1970 internal document, Haskell Laboratory, which received funding
from DuPont, reported that C8, one of hundreds of PFAS, was "highly toxic
when inhaled and moderately toxic when ingested." And Haskell Labs
discovered that dogs exposed to a single dosage of PFOA "died two days after
ingestion" in a 1979 confidential study for DuPont.
Two of eight pregnant workers who had worked in the C8 manufacture were
discovered to have given birth to children with birth abnormalities in 1980,
according to DuPont and 3M. The discovery was kept a secret from the public
and the staff, and the next year, a document inside the firm claimed, "We
know of no evidence of birth defects caused by C-8 at DuPont."
In spite of these and other instances, DuPont informed its staff in 1980
that C8 "has a lower toxicity, like table salt." According to a press
statement from 1991, "C-8 has no known toxic or adverse health effects in
humans at concentration levels detected," in reference to claims of PFAS
groundwater contamination close to one of DuPont's manufacturing
sites.
Following lawsuits in 1998 and 2002, media attention to PFAS contamination
grew. DuPont wrote to the EPA, "We need EPA to quickly (like first thing
tomorrow) say the following: That consumer products sold under the Teflon
brand are safe and to date there are no human health effects known to be
caused by PFOA."
DuPont was penalized by the EPA in 2004 for failing to disclose their
research on PFOA. At the time, the $16.45 million settlement represented the
biggest civil penalty collected under American environmental laws. However,
it was still a very modest portion of the $1 billion in PFOA and C8 sales
that DuPont generated annually in 2005.
"We hope the timeline of evidence presented in this paper will be helpful
to many countries as they pursue legal and legislative action to reduce PFAS
production," added Woodruff. "This timeline demonstrates significant
shortcomings in the way the United States currently regulates hazardous
chemicals."
Provided by
University of California, San Francisco
